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Abstrat
We study the performane of various agent strategies in an artiial investment senario.
Agents are equipped with a budget, x(t), and at eah time step invest a partiular fration,
q(t), of their budget. The return on investment (RoI), r(t), is haraterized by a periodi
funtion with dierent types and levels of noise. Risk-avoiding agents hoose their fration
q(t) proportional to the expeted positive RoI, while risk-seeking agents always hoose a
maximum value qmax if they predit the RoI to be positive (everything on red). In addition
to these dierent strategies, agents have dierent apabilities to predit the future r(t),
dependent on their internal omplexity. Here, we ompare 'zero-intelligent' agents using
tehnial analysis (suh as moving least squares) with agents using reinforement learning or
geneti algorithms to predit r(t). The performane of agents is measured by their average
budget growth after a ertain number of time steps. We present results of extensive omputer
simulations, whih show that, for our given artiial environment, (i) the risk-seeking strategy
outperforms the risk-avoiding one, and (ii) the geneti algorithm was able to nd this optimal
strategy itself, and thus outperforms other predition approahes onsidered.
keywords: risk, investment strategies, geneti algorithm
PACS Nos.: 05.40.-a, 89.65.Gh
1 Introdution
In the ourse of this paper, we investigate a model in whih agents with dierent strategies
partiipate in an simple investment senario with noisy returns [28℄. We use this setup to approah
the question how the (internal) omplexity of agents enhanes their performane in a hard-to-
predit environment. In the eld of artiial intelligene and omplex systems, one an distinguish
between two types of agents: rst, agents whih only reat on external hanges (also known as
zero-intelligene agents [9, 11℄) and seond, agents whih have a omplex internal arhiteture
(e.g. belief-desire-intention agents). Despite these lear dierenes in agent arhiteture, it is
diult to determine what inuene these properties have on the overall performane of the
agents. In order to study this question in a ontrolled environment, we have hosen an investment
model with noisy returns, to ompare the performane of simple and omplex agents. To whih
∗
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extent is worthwhile to equip an agent with omplex learning mehanisms instead of having a
reative response to exogenous returns?
As a neessary step to study more omplex senarios, we are interested in an initial study of the
performane of dierent agent arhitetures/investment strategies in the following simple setup:
eah agent has a ertain budget x(t) and is able to invest a ertain fration of its budget on a
market. The gain or loss it makes depends on the market return, or return on investment (RoI).
In other words, at eah time step t, the agent adjust its risk propensity, the fration of its budget
that it are willing to invest on the market, denoted by q(t), thereby ontrolling gains and losses
resulting from the RoI, denoted by r(t). We assume that only the past and urrent values of r(t)
are known to the agent; it does not know the dynamis governing future values of r(t). Agents
observe the market through the value of r(t) and, based on analysing a set of past r(t) values,
they predit future r(t) values and determine their behaviour on that market through speifying
q(t).
In this simple model, we onsider agents that invest independently in the market, i.e. there is no
interation or ommuniation with other agents. Also, there is no feedbak of the investments
done by agents on the market return. In other words, the environment of the agents is not
inuened by their investments. This is a ruial assumption whih makes our model dierent
from other attempts to model real market dynamis, e.g. as for nanial markets [18, 20, 32℄.
Consequently, we do not onstrut and investigate a market model; rather, our fous lies on
investigating what are good and what are bad strategies  in a rather artiial and ontrolled
market environment (see also Setion 4). Regarding the relevane of our results for real nanial
markets, see also our omments in the onluding Setion 7.
The essene of the model is aptured in Figure 1: (a) plots the returns in perent of a real stok
item over the range of about two years. This illustrates the range and shape of values of returns
of a real-world stok item. (b) illustrates the dynamis of the model: r(t), the market return,
inuenes the strategies agents have to adjust q(t), the risk propensity. In this partiular model,
we do not onsider the inuene that adjusted risk propensity has on the market return, i.e. the
inuene of q(t) on r(t).
The hallenge for the agents thus is twofold: rst, agents have to predit r(t) as aurately as
possible, and seond, they have to adjust q(t) to the proper values as quikly as possible. This is
a omplex and diult task sine most investment environments are unertain and utuating.
Choosing to avoid risk and investing too little may lead to small gains, and hoosing to take risk
and investing too muh may lead to large losses.
The task of nding an appropriate strategy that ontrols the risk and balanes between these
two extrema is by far not trivial. Methods from tehnial analysis, suh as estimations based on
moving averages ormoving least squares (see also Setion 3.2) try to approximate the behaviour of
the environment and, based on that approximation, determine the most appropriate investment
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Figure 1: (a) Real returns of a stok item (in this example, the stok was AAA, the Altana
Group) in perent over time (01/05/2002  01/03/2004). r(t) was omputed for a urrent prie
p(t) as follows: r(t) = log p(t) − log p(t− 1). (b) The dynamis of the market as indiated by
the market return r(t) and the strategy as dened by the invested budget q(t). Note that our
model does not onsider the feedbak of investments on the market dynamis (dashed line).
at a partiular time. In the theory of risk, several authors assume that individuals hoose among
assets based on the mean return and on the variane of the return [17, 21, 22℄. Others have
foused their attention to the important task of how to measure risk, whih lead to dierent type
of measures [1, 31℄. In general, these measures are based on the risk aversion of a deision maker
having the hoie to reeive a random or a non-random amount.
A typial senario to study investment strategies is to let an agent hoose between investing
in a risk-free asset or in a risky asset[31, 38℄. It was shown[38℄ that sometimes it may be more
reasonable to invest in a risk-free asset as a means to transfer wealth over time. However, assuming
a model with no onsumption [13℄, those agents investing in risk-free assets will be driven out of
the market in the long run by agents investing in a risky asset. When dealing with risky assets, it
is typially assumed that the agent onsiders the expeted return and its volatility as indiators
for the investment strategy [21℄.
For the sake of simpliity, in this paper we assume that the agent's behavior is risk-neutral in the
sense that the agent estimates only the expeted return, r(t), and does not onsider risk measures
suh as the volatility. Based on the estimation of r(t), the deision to inrease or derease the
investment fration of the risky asset should be taken. Hene, the two terms 'risk-seeking' and
'risk-avoiding' refer only to the hoie of the investment fration, q(t).
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: In the next setion, Setion 2, we present the
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details of the investment model, the properties and abilities of an agent ating/investing in this
environment. Following that, Setion 3 presents some of the strategies that an agent an use to
ontrol its risk propensity and Setion 4 presents the properties of the return on investment (RoI)
that we are onsidering; Setion 5 illustrates the optimal parameter adjustment for the presented
strategies and their derivation; Setion 6 ompares the dierent investment strategies. This is
done by means of simulations where the average total budget of agents using eah investment
strategy is obtained for a large a number of trials. Finally, in Setion 7, we present our onlusions.
2 Model
In this model, agents are haraterised by the following two variables:
1. their budget x(t), whih is a measure of their wealth or liquidity, and
2. the strategy that they employ in order to ontrol the fration of the budget q(t) to invest
at eah time step.
In other words, at eah time step t, an agent invests a portion q(t)x(t) of its budget. The
investment yields a gain or a loss, determined by the value of r(t). Being a fration of the
investment budget, q(t), is, of ourse, restrited to the interval between [0, 1]. However, in our
model we further restrit it to be from the interval [qmin, qmax] where we hoose qmin = 0.1 and
qmax = 1.0. This implies that, at eah time step t, there is a minimal investment of 0.1 of the
budget, and a maximal investment of the entire budget.
We an then dene the dynamis for the budget of agents x(t) as
x(t+ 1) = x(t)
[
1 + r(t) q(t)
]
(1)
where r(t) is the market return at the previous time step t. The market return funtion r(t) is
restrited to the range of [−1, 1]. A value of r(t) = −1 orresponds to a total loss of the invested
fration of the budget q(t) and r(t) = 1 orresponds to a gain equivalent to the invested fration.
Thus, an agent an, at any time step t, loose its omplete budget (for q(t) = 1 and r(t) = −1),
but also double its budget (for q(t) = 1 and r(t) = 1). In priniple, there is no upper boundary for
r(t), r(t) = 1 was hosen to obtain a mean of zero for r(t) whih allows us to better understand
the basi dynamis of this model. We emphasize again that, in our model, the aim is not a most
realisti simulation of the market return, but a omparison of dierent agent strategies. The
diulty for the agents lies in properly prediting the next value of r(t) and then adjusting q(t)
fast enough.
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Note that the restrition of r(t) to the range of [−1, 1] is not a realisti assumption for a real
market. There, some r(t) will also fall into the range ) − 1, 1(  these are rare, extreme events
that our, e.g. in ases of stok market bubbles and rashes. However, normally, returns will
be in the range of [−1, 1], e.g. as the ones of the stok depited in Figure 1. As we would like
to fous on the questions of hoosing appropriate agent strategies in environments with noisy,
periodi returns, it is reasonable to exlude suh rare, extreme events and assume a restrition
of r(t) to the range of [−1, 1].
In the next two setions, we will outline the agent strategies (Setion 3) and return on investment
(Setion 4) that we onsider.
3 Agent Strategies
As explained before, we are interested in how the market dynamis, r(t), aet the dierent
investment strategies of the agent, q(t). It is very important to realise that the market dynamis
 while aeting eah agent's q(t)  are not known to the agents. I.e., at time t, eah agent
only reeives the atual value of the Return on Investment (RoI) and adjusts its risk propensity
aordingly, without having a omplete knowledge about the dynamis of r(t). The agent may, of
ourse, have some bounded memory about past RoI that ould be used for preditions of future
RoI. However, the agent has to gather information about the ups and downs of the RoI and to
draw its own onlusions from this information by itself. Therefore, the agent will perform better
in the environment if it is able to guess the market dynamis.
In the following, we present a seletion of strategies that an be applied by agents. We distinguish
a referene strategy, whih serves as a frame of referene to ompare and evaluate the performane
of other strategies, as well as tehnial analysis-based and mahine learning-based strategies.
Usually (there are exeptions, as will be disussed in the following), a strategy onsists of two
omponents: a predition omponent and an ation omponent. For suh strategies, the predition
omponent predits a variable in the system  in this ase, the next value of r(t)  and the ation
omponent then denes an ation upon the predition of the variable  in this ase, it denes
the appropriate value for q(t).
3.1 Referene Strategy
In order to ompare dierent strategies, we need a point of referene against whih the perfor-
mane of eah strategy an be measured. The referene strategy that we are using is the most
simple strategy possible, i.e. that an agent always assumes a onstant risk-propensity value q0 at
every time step t:
q(t) = q0 = const. (2)
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Sine the value of q(t) is always xed, this is not really a strategy, but it plays a role in more
physis-inspired investment models [28, 34, 37℄. We use this strategy to ompare it with more
omplex strategies. Note that this referene strategy requires no knowledge on the RoI.
3.2 Tehnial Analysis
The following simple strategies for risk adjustment are based on tehnial analysis [3℄. Tehnial
analysis tries to dedue information about the dynamis of r(t) by looking at trends (averages,
varianes, higher order moments) of the RoI values over a range of time. This assumes that an
agent has a bounded memory of sizeM to reord previous RoI; this information is then proessed
in dierent ways to predit the next RoI. In the following, we onsider two strategies from the
eld of tehnial analysis: the rst strategy is based on alulating moving averages (MA) on
previous RoI, while the seond strategy uses moving least squares (MLS) on previous RoI, r(t),
over a xed period of time, M . Both of them an be regarded as zero-intelligene strategies, as
agents do not do any reasoning or learning.
3.2.1 Moving Averages
The moving averages tehnique omputes rˆMA(t), an estimate of the next r(t), as the average of
the previous M values of r(t):
rˆMA(t) =
1
M
t−1∑
n=t−M
r(n) (3)
3.2.2 Moving Least Squares
The moving least squares tehnique ts a funtion to the data of the previous M values of r(t)
to estimate the next r(t). In our ase, we hoose this funtion to be a linear trend-line, whih is
found by minimising the distane to the data points of r(t). Based on the previous M values of
r(t), the squared estimation error ǫr is dened as:
ǫr(t) =
1
M
t∑
n=t−M+1
[r(n)− rˆMLS(n)]
2
(4)
where rˆMLS(t) is the predited RoI based on the linear regression trend-line, dened as:
rˆMLS(t
′) = m(t) t′ + b(t) for t−M ≤ t′ ≤ t (5)
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Now, the best tting values m and b are obtained by minimising the squared error estimation,
eq. (4). From ∂ǫr/∂m = 0 and ∂ǫr/∂b = 0, we get, as it is well known:
m(t) =
M
t∑
n=t−M+1
n r(n) −
(
t∑
n=t−M+1
n
)(
t∑
n=t−M+1
r(n)
)
M
t∑
n=t−M+1
n2 −
(
t∑
n=t−M+1
n
)2 (6)
b(t) =
1
M
[
t∑
n=t−M+1
r(n)−m(t)
t∑
n=t−M+1
n
]
(7)
These two strategies use dierent approahes to estimate future r(t); it remains to dene the
orresponding adjustment of the risk propensity: here, we onsider two possibilities. First, a risk-
seeking (RS) and, seond, a risk-avoiding (RA) approah. In the risk-seeking approah, the value
of qRS(t) is dened as follows for rˆ(t) ∈ {rˆMA(t), rˆMLS(t)}, i.e. for rˆ(t) being an MA or MLS
estimate of r(t):
qRS(t) =
{
qmin rˆ(t) ≤ 0
qmax rˆ(t) > 0
(8)
where qmin, qmax ∈ [0, 1] and qmin < qmax. In other words, agents invest qmin if the next value
of r(t) is predited to be negative or zero, and agents invest qmax if the next value of r(t) is
predited to be positive.
In the risk-avoiding approah, the value of qRA(t) is dened as follows for rˆ(t) ∈
{rˆMA(t), rˆMLS(t)}, i.e. for rˆ(t) being an MA or MLS estimate of r(t):
qRA(t) =


qmin rˆ(t) ≤ qmin
rˆ(t) qmin < rˆ(t) < qmax
qmax rˆ(t) ≥ qmax
(9)
where qmin, qmax ∈ [0, 1] and qmin < qmax. Here, the respetive q(t) is set to the predited r(t)
(with appropriate adjustments to ensure that q(t) = qmin whenever rˆ(t) ≤ qmin and q(t) = qmax
whenever rˆ(t) ≥ qmax)  agents only invest a fration of the budget whih orresponds in size to
the expeted return.
3.3 Mahine Learning Approahes
Another lass of strategies for risk adjustment is based on more omplex agent information
proessing apabilities from the eld of mahine learning. In this paper, we onsider two suh
approahes: one based on an inremental update rule (IUR), whih is a form of reinforement
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learning, and the other based on a geneti algorithm (GA), whih is a form of evolutionary
learning.
3.3.1 Inremental Update Rule
The following mahine learning approah is based on the inremental update rule, an appliation
of reinforement learning [35℄. The idea of reinforement learning is that an agent ontinuously
uses a reward signal to adjust its own performane. In our senario, the values of the return
are the reward signal; at eah step, the agent omputes the error between the predited and the
atual value of the return and uses this error to adjust the estimation of the following return.
The general inremental update rule from reinforement learning is dened as follows:
NewEst ← OldEst + StepSize[Target −OldEst ] (10)
OldEst and NewEst are the old and new estimates for the quantity of interest. So, Target −
OldEst gives the error of the urrent estimation, whih is weighted by the fator StepSize. This
is, a new estimate is omputed by taking the old estimate and adjusting it by the error of the
urrent estimate. NewEst has to be updated at eah time step. Applying eq. (10) to our model,
we nd the following instane of the inremental update rule:
rˆIUR(t+ 1) = rˆIUR(t) + γ
[
r(t)− rˆIUR(t)
]
(11)
Consequently, OldEst and NewEst are the old and new estimates for the return, rˆIUR(t) and
rˆIUR(t+1); furthermore, r(t)−rˆIUR(t) is the error of the urrent estimate. Beause of its reursive
denition, the inremental update rule onsiders an innite history of returns  of ourse, the
weight of a value depends on its age and its impat fades over time. We hose rˆIUR(0) = 0 as
the initial value of rˆIUR(t). Dierent values of γ lead to dierent performane of the algorithm;
in other words, for small γ, the adjustment of the estimate will be small, and for large γ, the
adjustment of the estimate will be large. It is important to hoose an optimal value for γ in order
to be able to ompare the algorithm with other algorithms; in the next setion, we will disuss
this in more detail. Finally, it remains to speify what ation to do given a partiular estimate
for the next return; we again dene a risk-seeking and a risk-avoiding approah, similar to eq. 8
and 9 for the MA and MLS strategies:
In the risk-seeking approah, qRS(t) is dened as follows for rˆIUR(t):
qRS(t) =
{
qmin rˆIUR(t) ≤ 0
qmax rˆIUR(t) > 0
(12)
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and in the risk-avoiding approah, qRA(t) is dened as follows for rˆIUR(t):
qRA(t) =


qmin rˆIUR(t) ≤ qmin
rˆIUR(t) qmin < rˆIUR(t) < qmax
qmax rˆIUR(t) ≥ qmax
(13)
where, for both denitions, qmin, qmax ∈ [0, 1] and qmin < qmax.
It is important to note that reinforement learning and the inremental update rule are not
idential; rather, reinforement learning desribes a group of mahine learning approahes and
the inremental update rule is one instane of these approahes.
We note eventually that a dierent representation of γ in eq.(11) ould be used to study some
aspets of the prospet theory of deision-making. This theory takes into aount that deisions
are made based on hanges from a ertain referene point, i.e. humans for example deide dif-
ferently for prots and for losses, as they ognize losses twie as large as prots, [6, 14, 15, 36℄.
This, however, is not the target of the present investigations.
3.3.2 Geneti Algorithm
Geneti algorithms (GA) are a tehnique from the eld of artiial intelligene whih nds
approximate solutions to problems. Geneti algorithms belong to the lass of evolutionary al-
gorithms. Geneti algorithms are based on modelling solutions to a problem as a population
of hromosomes; and the hromosomes are andidate solutions to the problem whih gradually
evolve to better solutions to the problem. The following is a desription of the instane of a
geneti algorithm whih we apply to our senario:
Let j = 1, ..., C be a hromosome with population size C. Eah hromosome j is an array of
genes, gjk (k = 0, ..., G − 1). The values of the genes are real numbers [24℄. In our model, eah
hromosome j represents a set of possible strategies of an agent, so the gjk refers to possible
values for the risk propensity q.
In the beginning, eah gjk is assigned a random value: gjk ∈ (qmin, qmax). Eah hromosome j is
then evaluated by a tness funtion, fj(τ), whih is dened as follows:
fj(τ) =
G−1∑
k=0
r(t) gjk ; k ≡ t mod G (14)
In our model, the tness is determined by the gain/loss that eah strategy gjk yields depending
on the RoI, r(t). Sine the tness of a hromosome must to be maximised, negative r(t) lead to
very small values of gjk, i.e. a low risk propensity, whereas positive r(t) lead to larger values of
gjk. This lets us onsider the produt of r(t)gjk as a performane measure of a hromosome.
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The values of gjk are always multiplied by dierent r(t) values  i.e., depending on t. For the
hromosome, we dene a further time sale τ in terms of generations. A generation is ompleted
after eah gjk is multiplied by a RoI from onseutive time steps, t. This means that the index k
refers to a partiular time t in the following manner: k ≡ t mod G, whih means k = tˆ ∈ {1, G},
with t = tˆ+ τG, τ = 0, 1, 2, ....
After time τ , the population of hromosomes is replaed by a new population of better tting
hromosomes with the same population size C. This new population is determined in the following
manner: after alulating the tness of eah hromosome aording to eq. (14), we nd the best
hromosomes from the old population by applying elitist and tournament seletion of size two:
• Elitist seletion onsiders the best s perentage of the population whih is found by ranking
the hromosomes aording to their tness. The best hromosomes are diretly transferred
to the new population.
• Tournament seletion is done by randomly hoosing two pairs of two hromosomes from
the old population and then seleting from eah pair the one with the higher tness.
These two hromosomes are not simply transferred to the new population, but undergo a
transformation based on the geneti operators rossover and mutation, as follows: A single-
point rossover operator nds the ross point, or ut point, in the two hromosomes beyond
whih the geneti material from two parents is exhanged, to form two new hromosomes.
This ut point is the integer part of a random number drawn from a uniform distribution
pc ∈ U(1, G).
After the rossover, a mutation operator is applied to eah gene of the newly formed hromosomes.
With a given mutation probability pm ∈ U(0, 1), a gene is to be mutated by replaing its value
by a random number from a uniform distribution U(qmin, qmax). After the yle of seletion,
rossover and mutation is ompleted, we eventually arrive at a new population of hromosomes
that onsists of a perentage of the best tted hromosomes from the old population plus a
number of new hromosomes that ensure further possibilities for the evolution of the set of
strategies.
Given the optimised population of hromosomes representing a set of possible strategies, the
agent still needs to update its atual risk propensity, qi(t). This works as follows: at time t = τ ,
the agent takes the set of strategies gjk from the hromosome j with the highest tness in the
previous generation. Given G = T , this means that the agent for eah time step of the upoming
yli hange hooses the appropriate risk propensity by omputing the following:
qGA(t) = gjk with j = arg (maxj=1,...,C fj) ; t ≡ k mod G (15)
This onludes the overview of the dierent agent strategies applied in our senario. In the
following setion we will adjust the respetive parameters of eah of these strategies so that they
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are optimal. This is ruial for a omparison of the dierent agent strategies  only strategies
that perform at their best an be ompared.
4 Return on Investment
Given the assumptions stated, we have to provide a funtion for r(t) whih is independent of
q(t). In some of the models previously studied in the literature [16℄, the inuene of the market
is simply treated as random, i.e. r(t) is a random number drawn from a uniform distribution in
the interval [−1, 1].
However, it is known that for returns with a uniform distribution entered around the origin
and agents whih do not have any information on future market returns, this situation will lead
the agents to a omplete loss of their budget. This is a well-known property of multipliative
stohasti proesses [28℄. The only way to make a prot on the return is by having a ertain
knowledge on future returns of the market. This requires both that there exist orrelations in
the market return funtion, and that the agents are able to resolve and use those orrelations to
make orret preditions. Consequently, we hoose to introdue orrelations in our market return
r(t) under the form of a seasonal or periodi signal.
We study two dierent market return funtions that depend on a noise level σ1,2; for σ1,2 = 0,
they orrespond to a pure sine wave funtion with frequeny w and for σ1,2 = 1, they are
ompletely unorrelated:
rPhase(t) = sin(w t+ σ1 π ξ) (16)
rAmplitude(t) = (1− σ2) sin(w t) + σ2 ξ (17)
where ξ is distributed uniformly in the interval [−1, 1], i.e. ξ ∈ U(−1, 1). There are two types
of noise that an our with suh a sine wave funtion  noise on the phase and noise on the
amplitude. We onsider both ases: the rst funtion an be seen as a periodi market return
signal with phase noise (determined by σ1), the seond as a periodi market return signal with
amplitude noise (determined by σ2). In our simulations, we hose the arbitrary value of T = 100
for the period of the sine wave. Fig. 2 shows plots for these two kinds of return funtions with
dierent noise levels. Note that periodi returns with a periodiity hanging over time are invested
reently as well.[27℄
The noise parameter σ1,2 gives us a way of ontrolling the noise in the RoI, thereby allowing us
to evaluate the various strategies for dierent senarios, ranging from a ompletely lear signal
with no noise at all (for σ1,2 = 0) to a noise-only signal (for σ1,2 = 1). This makes it possible for
us to determine how well multiple strategies perform for dierent types and levels of noise and
what impat the type and level of noise has on a single strategy.
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Figure 2: Plots of the return funtions r(t), eq. 16 for: (a) two dierent phase noise levels:
(top) σ1 = 0.1 and (bottom) σ1 = 0.5; (b) two dierent amplitude noise levels: (top) σ2 = 0.1
and (bottom) σ2 = 0.5.
Agents have no knowledge about future market returns; of ourse, they do not know the funtions
that determine r(t). Thus, the only way for agents to maximize their gain and minimize their
losses is by making a orret predition of the future market return and hoosing the appropriate
investment ation. Coneptually, we an separate an agent's strategy into two omponents: a
predition omponent and an ation omponent. The predition algorithm estimates the future
values of the market return and the ation algorithm determines the best ation based on the
predited results.
We study the performane of the dierent algorithms or strategies that are explained in setion
3. We dene the performane of an agent employing a partiular strategy as being the average
growth of the budget x(t) of the agent olleted after a ertain number of time steps. We hoose
to take this average over t = T = 100 time steps, T being the period of the sine wave. The reason
for this partiular hoie is that, for a onstant investment ation and a return funtion with no
noise, this average value will have zero standard deviation. In ontrast, if we do the averaging of
the growth over all the time steps there will be a non-zero standard deviation assoiated with
the sine wave. In setion 6, we ompare the performane of the dierent strategies.
In order to interpret the results that we obtain and present in this paper, it is useful to understand
some properties of the two dierent return funtions. Two properties are of partiular interest:
the absolute average value of the return, and the orrelation between the sign of two onseutive
returns.
For the sake of ompleteness, we show the probability distribution of the RoI in Fig. 3. For the
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Figure 3: Probability distribution of the RoI, r(t), eq. 16, for: (a) phase noise σ1 =
{0.1, 0.5, 0.9} and (b) amplitude noise σ2 = {0.1, 0.5, 0.9}.
probability distributions of r(t) with phase noise, we see that there is a higher probability for
values lose to −1 and 1, and a lower probability for values lose to 0. Note that this is the same
distribution that is found for a sine wave with no noise at all. For phase noise, the value of σ1 has
no eet  the distributions are virtually idential. For the probability distributions of r(t) with
amplitude noise, we observe a probability distribution whih is a ombination of the probability
distribution of a sine wave without noise (aused by the sine wave) and a uniform probability
distribution (aused by the noise). For higher levels of noise, the onvolution of probability
distributions more losely resembles the uniform distribution, and for lower levels of noise, the
onvolution of probability distributions more losely resembles the sine wave distribution. For
amplitude noise, the value of σ2 is ruial and dierent values lead to dierent distributions. Note
that the distribution of the returns for phase noise is independent of the level of noise, whereas
for the RoI with amplitude noise there is a signiant hange as the level of noise is inreased.
Sine the distribution of the RoI is independent of the noise level σ1 for phase noise, it is expeted
that the average absolute RoI, Fig. 4, is onstant with respet to σ1 in the RoI. This, as we have
explained, is not the ase for the noise level σ2 for amplitude noise, where the average absolute
RoI is varying with respet to σ2 in the RoI. For σ1 = 0 and σ2 = 0, the average absolute value of
the RoI are equal. Roughly, the average absolute value of the RoI with amplitude noise dereases
for σ2 < 0.6 and it inreases for σ2 ≥ 0.6. This mathes with the observations for the probability
distributions: there, for σ2 = 0.5, the values are onentrated around r(t) = 0, leading to smaller
〈|r(t)|〉, and for σ2 = 0.1 and σ2 = 0.9, the values are less onentrated around r(t) = 0, leading
to larger 〈|r(t)|〉.
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Figure 4: Average absolute value of the RoI, r(t), eq. 16, for phase noise (red, top line) and for
amplitude noise (blak, bottom line).
The average absolute RoI is of importane beause its known from multipliative stohasti
proesses [28, 34℄, that for a onstant investment q(t) = q0 the better performing onstant
strategies are the ones that invest the least possible amount. In our model, the agents are fored
to invest the minimum amount of qmin = 0.1. Sine q(t) is multiplied with r(t) in eq. 1, the
hange in average absolute value of r(t) has an impat similar to the hange in q0 seen in the
multipliative stohasti proesses [28℄ studied. This leads to hanges in performane that are
not neessarily related with the performane of agents, and should be taken into aount when
interpreting the results.
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Figure 5: Distribution of the orrelations of the RoI in time, r(t), eq. 16, for: (a) phase noise
with σ1 = {0.1, 0.5, 0.9} and (b) amplitude noise with σ2 = {0.1, 0.5, 0.9}.
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The orrelation between the sign of two onseutive returns shows whether it is possible to draw
onlusions from the sign of r(t) on the sign of r(t + 1). In Fig. 5 we show the distribution of
the orrelations of the RoI with respet to two onseutive returns, r(t)r(t+ 1). We an learly
see that for low levels of noise there is bigger orrelation between onseutive values. As the
noise inreases this orrelation diminishes until, nally, for high levels of noise, the returns are
ompletely unorrelated.
Most of the algorithms studied are sensitive to orrelations in onseutive RoI with the same
sign. We notie that between the returns with phase noise and amplitude noise, orrelations do
not vary exatly in the same manner with noise. In partiular, it an learly be seen that for
σ1,2 = 0.5 the amplitude noise has still more orrelation than the phase noise. This dierene
an aount for some disrepanies seen between the performane of the agents for the two types
of market return funtions.
5 Optimal Parameter Adjustment
In the previous setions, we have dened several dierent strategies that an be applied by agents
to determine when to invest whih amount of money. In the next setion, we want to ompare their
performane in a periodi environment. However, in order to make this omparison meaningful,
we have to ensure that we have adjusted the dierent parameters of the strategies properly. Only
if the strategies perform at their optimum, they an really be ompared.
The proedure that we apply to adjust the optimal parameters is straightforward: we ompare
the performane  averaged over 105 periods  of eah of the algorithms for a range of possible
parameters and then hoose the optimal one. At this point, it remains to dene the notion of
optimality: we have already dened that we measure the performane of agents as the average
of their budget growth over a ertain number of time steps. The optimal strategy is the strategy
that performs better than all the other strategies, i.e. the strategy that, on average, leads to the
greatest budget growth. Of ourse, for the measurement, eah agent has to be provided with
enough time to gather the information neessary for the proper alibration of the algorithm that
it applies.
For the MA, MLS, and IUR strategies, there is only one parameter that requires adjustment:
either the memory size M (in the ase of MA and MLS) or the step size γ (in the ase of IUR).
This implies that for these strategies, it is possible to hoose the optimal value of the parameter
by omparing the average budget 〈x(t)〉 for several possible values of the parameter, and then
take the one whih gives the best results. For MA and MLS, we have onsidered memory sizes
M ∈ [1, 50] and for IUR, we have onsidered step sizes γ ∈ [0, 1].
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For the GA strategy, there are, however, several parameters whih require adjustment: the pop-
ulation size, C, the rossover probability, pc, the mutation probability, pm, and the elitism size,
s. Consequently, the proess of nding the optimal ombination of values for the parameters
is not as trivial as for the other strategies. The +CARPS (Multiagent System for Conguring
Algorithms in Real Problem Solving) tool [25, 26℄ was used during this step. This appliation
uses autonomous, distributed, ooperative agents that searh for solutions to a onguration
problem, thereby ne-tuning the meta-heuristi's parameters. The agents in +CARPS apply a
Random Restart Hill-Climbing approah and they exhange their so-far best solutions to the
problem in the proess. The intervals of denition, i.e. the intervals in whih the most aeptable
GA ongurations should lie, were set as follows: C ∈ {50, 100, 200, 500, 1000}, pc ∈ [0.0, 1.0],
pm ∈ [0.0, 1.0], and s ∈ [0.0, 0.5],
Table 1: Optimal Strategy Parameters
Algorithm Parameters
MA M = 5 (risk-seeking), M = 2 (risk-avoiding)
MLS M = 25 (both risk-seeking and risk-avoiding)
IUR γ = 0.5 (both risk-seeking and risk-avoiding)
GA C = 1000, pc = 0.7, pm = 0.01, s = 0.3
Table 1 shows the optimal parameters that we hoose for the omparison of the dierent strate-
gies. Of ourse, the optimal parameters usually are not the same for dierent types and levels of
noise or for risk-seeking and risk-avoiding behaviour, so at times, a ompromise between several
alternative values for dierent situations had to be found.
6 Results
In this setion, we ompare all strategies presented in this artile for RoI with periodiity T = 100
and dierent noise levels for both phase and amplitude noise. In our omparison, we onsider a
set of agents, eah one using one of the following strategies: Q0 eq. (2), MA eq. (3), MLS eq. (6),
IUR eq. (11), and GA eq. (15). Note that periodi returns with a periodiity hanging over time
are invested reently as well.[27℄
In our omparison, we make two assumptions: rst, all agents reeive the same RoI at a partiular
time, i.e. the fat that some agents win or loose more than others is inuened only by their
dierent strategies to determine the orret risk-propensity value; seond, all agents use the
optimal parameter values of their respetive strategies. Let us state again that only the past and
urrent values of r(t) are known to the agents; they do not know the dynamis governing future
values of r(t).
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We perform N = 100 trials of the same experiment, i.e. RoI with same parameters, where at
eah end of a yle of the RoI, i.e. for all t suh that t mod T ≡ 0, an average budget is obtained
for eah agent over the 100 trials. This is done for a large number of time steps, i.e. t = 105.
We vary the amplitude noise values, σ2 ∈ (0, 1), while leaving the phase noise value onstant,
σ1 = 0, and we vary the phase noise values, σ1 ∈ (0, 1), while leaving the amplitude noise value
onstant, σ2 = 0. For the simulations whih distinguish between a risk-seeking and a risk-avoiding
ation upon a predition of the RoI, we ompute the average budget for both approahes. This
gives us four variants of the simulations: amplitude noise/risk seeking, phase noise/risk seeking,
amplitude noise/risk avoiding, and phase noise/risk avoiding.
6.1 Comparison
Fig. 6 shows the result of the simulations by plotting the average budget resulting from the dif-
ferent strategies against the noise level for eah of the four variants of the simulations (amplitude
noise/risk seeking in (a), phase noise/risk seeking in (b), amplitude noise/risk avoiding in (),
and phase noise/risk avoiding in (d)).
For all variants of the simulations, the onstant-risk strategy is the worst strategy. The onstant-
risk strategy always puts a onstant proportion of the budget at stake. This money is won when
the return is positive, but also lost when the return is negative; even though 〈|r(t)|〉 = 0, this
leads to a loss in budget over time, as this is a well known property for multipliative stohasti
proesses.
Furthermore, for all strategies, the average budget dereases with inreasing noise. That is the
expeted behaviour: with inreasing noise, the auray of the preditions made by the agents
dereases, and thus they annot neessarily hose the appropriate risk propensity in the ation.
There are no signiant rossovers of the performane of dierent strategies. In general, this
implies that if a strategy s1 performs better than a strategy s2 for a given noise level σa (either
on the phase or on the amplitude), s1 an be expeted to perform better than s2 for a dierent
noise level σb. Consequently, the hoie of strategy is independent of the noise in the return 
a good strategy is a good strategy for all noise levels, and a bad strategy is a bad strategy for
all noise levels, too. However, for low noise levels, the GA is slightly outperformed by the other
strategies  this is due to the intrinsi stohasti nature of the algorithm; for the same reason,
this algorithm performs better for high noise levels. Note that the experiments in this simulations
are done for t = 105 time steps, whih orresponds also to the learning phase for the GA.
For phase noise, the average budget obtained is roughly omparable to that for amplitude noise,
although the dierenes between strategies are greater for phase noise than for amplitude noise.
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Figure 6: Average budget over N = 100 trials, for agents using strategies Q0, MA, MLS, GA,
IUR and SW (square wave, to be introdued in setion 6.2), over t = 105 time steps. Agents
use optimal parameter values for RoI with periodiity, T = 100, and dierent noise levels: (a)
dierent amplitude noise values, σ2 ∈ (0, 1), and no phase noise, σ1 = 0 with a risk-seeking
strategy; (b) dierent phase noise values, σ1 ∈ (0, 1), and no amplitude noise, σ2 = 0 with a
risk-seeking strategy; () dierent amplitude noise values, σ2 ∈ (0, 1), and no phase noise, σ1 =
0 with a risk-avoiding strategy, and (d) dierent phase noise values, σ1 ∈ (0, 1), and no ampli-
tude noise, σ2 = 0 with a risk-avoiding strategy.
From the range of strategies employed, the simple strategies (MA, MLS, IUR) were almost always
outperformed by the omplex one (GA). Other researhers [4, 11℄ have shown that this needs
not neessarily be the ase.
6.2 Optimal Strategy
As a onsequene of the omparison it is logial to investigate what would be the optimal strategy
in the given senario. Given the fat that the GA performs best of all the strategies, it makes
18/27
J. E. Navarro B., F. E. Walter, F. Shweitzer:
Risk-Seeking vs. Risk-Avoiding Investments in Noisy Periodi Environments
International Journal of Modern Physis C vol. 19, no 6 (2008), pp. 971-994
See http://www.sg.ethz.h for more information.
sense to look at the q(t) as hosen by the GA for r(t) over time, in order to analyse why the GA
performs so well. Fig. 7 plots the values of r(t) and the orresponding q(t) as hosen by the GA
against time t for dierent noises and from dierent times tn on. From the graph, it is visible that
the behaviour of the GA resembles a square wave funtion whih is a type of a ramp-retangle
funtion.
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Figure 7: Values of the return r(t) and the risk propensity q(t) as hosen by the GA for RoI
with dierent types of noise and for dierent times during the simulation: (a) amplitude noise,
σ1 = 0, σ2 = 0.5, tn ≈ 10, 000, (b) amplitude noise, σ1 = 0, σ2 = 0.5, tn ≈ 100, 000, () phase
noise, σ1 = 0.5, σ2 = 0, tn ≈ 10, 000, (d) phase noise, σ1 = 0.5, σ2 = 0, tn ≈ 100, 000.
The ramp-retangle (RR) funtion maps RoI that are unertain to inreasing/dereasing risk-
propensity values and RoI that are ertainly positive or negative to a maximal or minimal
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risk-propensity value, respetively. The orresponding strategy is expressed as follows:
q(t+ 1) =


(
qmax−qmin
h1
)
tˆ+ qmin if tˆ ∈ (0, h1)
qmax if tˆ ∈ [h1, h2](
qmax−qmin
h2−h3
)
(tˆ− h2) + qmax if tˆ ∈ (h2, h3)
qmin if tˆ ∈ [h3, h4]
(18)
In this funtion, h1 (h3) sets the transition from an inreasing (dereasing) ramp funtion to
a retangle funtion and h2(h4) sets the transition from a retangle funtion to a dereasing
(inreasing) ramp funtion. Moreover, for eah time step, t, the following ongruene is used:
tˆ ≡ t mod h4; this maps eah time step t ∈ (0,∞) to a time step in the ramp-retangle funtion,
tˆ ∈ (0, h4).
Furthermore, we assume that the dierenes between time steps when an agent inreases and
dereases its risk propensity values are symmetri. This means that the time dierene △h
between when the ramp funtion starts and stops to inrease or derease an be expressed as
follows:
△h = h1 = h3 − h2 (19)
whih for △h = 1, means that agents use a Square Wave (SW) strategy. We are partiularly
interested in this ase of the ramp-retangle funtion: it implies that an agent invests qmax for
time steps tˆ ∈ (0, T/2), and invests qmin for time steps tˆ ∈ [T/2, T ]. This is the optimal strategy.
The GA approahes the optimal strategy: for all dierent noises, the risk propensity q(t) hosen
by the GA approximates the one that would have been hosen by SW. Considering that the GA
does not have an `a priori'-behaviour dened, it is interesting to realise that it nds the optimal
strategy  investing the maximum when, at a partiular time t in the period, the probability of
winning is higher than loosing and vie versa  on its own.
Fig. 7 illustrates this behaviour. It plots the values of r(t) and the orresponding q(t) as hosen
by the geneti algorithm against time t for dierent noises and from dierent times tn on. From
this, it is learly visible that the behaviour of the GA is very similar to the behaviour of the
SW, whih is the optimal strategy. Comparing g. 7 (a) with (b) and g. 7 () with (d), i.e. the
same senario, but at dierent times tn1 = 10, 000 and tn2 = 100, 000, one an see that the q(t)
hosen by the GA approah the ones hosen by the SW more losely as time goes on  i.e., as
the GA has more time to evolve. Additionally, from the simulation results, it an be observed
the approximation of the SW by the GA is loser for low levels of noise than for high levels of
noise. This is the expeted behaviour.
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6.3 Everything on Red
Furthermore, from the plots, we an observe that for low levels of noise, the risk-seeking behaviour
learly outperforms the risk-avoiding behaviour: always investing the maximum when a positive
return is expeted and investing the minimum when a negative return is expeted outperforms
investing a quantity proportional to the expeted return. This may seem ounter-intuitive 
humans would probably hoose not to invest their omplete budget when they know that there
is a ertain probability to lose it.
However, this behaviour is explained as follows: onsider r(t) to be periodi with a period of T
and, for the moment, assume that there is no noise, i.e. σ1 = 0 as well as σ2 = 0. Then, the
optimal strategy would be to invest the omplete budget or qmax during [0, T/2) and to invest
nothing or qmin during [T/2, T ). This is beause it is ertain  we assumed that there is no noise
 that during the rst half of the period, [0, T/2), the value of r(t) will be positive and during the
seond half of the period, [T/2, T ), the value of r(t) will be negative. No matter what the preise
values of r(t) are, one they are positive, this leads to a gain, and thus q(t) should be as large
as possible to maximise the gain; onversely, one the values of r(t) are negative, this leads to a
loss, and thus q(t) should be as small as possible or zero to minimise the loss. In other words,
for determining q(t), not the quantity of the expeted return matters, but whether the probability
of the expeted return being positive is greater than the probability of the expeted return being
negative. This explains why the risk-seeking behaviour outperforms the risk-avoiding behaviour
for periodi returns with no noise. The behaviour of this strategy is shown in Fig. 8 (a).
For periodi returns with noise, i.e., σ1 6= 0 or σ2 6= 0, the situation is quite similar. Depending
on the values of σ1 and σ2, there will be two intervals [0 + ǫ, (T/2) − ǫ) and [(T/2) + ǫ, T − ǫ)
suh that during [0 + ǫ, (T/2) − ǫ), the value of r(t) will  on average  be positive and suh
that during [(T/2) + ǫ, T − ǫ), the value of r(t) will  on average  be negative, see Fig. 8 (a).
In these intervals, the optimal strategy would again be to invest the omplete budget or qmax
and to invest nothing or qmin, respetively. The value of ǫ, of ourse, depends on σ1 and σ2, i.e.
the more noise, the greater ǫ. Now, what still has to be onsidered are the intervals [0, 0 + ǫ),
[(T/2) − ǫ, (T/2) + ǫ), and [T − ǫ, T ). Beause of the noise, it is not possible to determine the
exat sign of r(t) during these intervals.
However, it still is possible to say that  on average  the probability of r(t) being positive is
greater than the probability of r(t) being negative during [0, 0 + ǫ) and [(T/2)− ǫ, T/2) and the
probability of r(t) being negative is greater than the probability of r(t) being positive during
[T/2, (T/2) + ǫ) and [T − ǫ, T ). Consequently, it makes sense to invest during [0, 0 + ǫ) and
[(T/2) − ǫ, T/2) and not to invest during [T/2, (T/2) + ǫ) and [T − ǫ, T ).
With suh behaviour, there will, however, be the situation that an agent invests the omplete
budget, but the return is negative. In this type of situation, |r(t)| depends on σ1 and σ2: for small
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Figure 8: Intervals of ertainty and unertainty: (a) shows r(t) with no noise and the orre-
sponding q(t) of the square wave (SW) strategy plotted against t and (b) shows r(t) with noise
and the dierent intervals for whih dierent onlusions about the sign of the return an be
drawn: (2) and (5) are the intervals in whih the sign of r(t) is ertain to be positive or neg-
ative, respetively, and (1), (3), (4), and (6) are the intervals in whih the the sign of r(t) is
unertain.
σ1 and σ2, it will be small, too. Consequently, for low levels of noise, the produt of q(t)r(t) would
be a small value, whih signies, for r(t) < 0, a small loss, and for r(t) > 0, a small gain. Thus,
even for q(t) = 1, the loss is bound to a proportion of the budget orresponding to the value of
r(t). This explains why the risk-seeking behaviour outperforms the risk-avoiding behaviour for
low levels of noise. For high levels of noise, the produt of q(t)r(t) needs not neessarily be a
small value, whih potentially signies, for r(t) < 0, a large loss, and for r(t) > 0, a large gain.
Thus, an agent ould potentially loose a signiant amount of its budget if it invests the omplete
budget; this is the reason why, for high levels of noise, the risk-avoiding behaviour outperforms
the risk-seeking behaviour.
This also provides a straightforward explanation why dierent algorithms using the same rule to
determine q(t) perform dierently. Even though the best strategy is to still invest the maximum
when there is a slightly better probability that r(t) > 0 than that r(t) ≤ 0, the algorithms fail
to predit the exat probabilities of r(t) > 0 and of r(t) ≤ 0 with good enough auray to
determine how to properly invest. In other words, the performane of the ation depends on the
auray of the predition; if the auray of the predition is high, then the performane of the
ation is good, and if the auray of the predition is low, then the performane of the ation
is bad, too. The GA does not exhibit this predition-ation behaviour and it is able to adjust
better than the other strategies.
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7 Disussion and Conlusions
In this paper, we have presented a number of strategies that an be applied by agents in an
investment market senario with periodi returns and dierent types and levels of noise. We
have ompared their performane  the respetive average budget growth over a ertain number
of time steps  and analysed the results. We have made three main observations:
1. The type of noise  whether the RoI has phase or amplitude noise  does not have a
signiant inuene on the performane of the algorithms, while the level of noise ertainly
does  for inreasing noise, we observe dereasing performane.
2. The GA performs best of all strategies for almost all senarios; it disovers a strategy whih
resembles a square wave strategy and whih follows the priniple of always investing the
omplete budget or the maximum amount possible when the expeted return is positive and
not investing anything or the least amount possible when the expeted return is negative.
3. The best rule for investment is the risk-seeking behaviour of always putting the omplete
budget in an investment; this behaviour learly outperforms a risk-avoiding behaviour
whih humans would probably apply intuitively: whilst it may seem intuitive to a human
to invest an amount proportional to the expeted return, this is not the approah whih
yields the greatest budget growth over time.
Consequently, returning to our original goal to nd an answer to the question of to whih extent
the internal omplexity of agents inuenes their overall performane, we an state that, in our
simple senario, the agents with a omplex arhiteture outperform the agents with a simple
arhiteture.
Although, with respet to the question above, the major fous on this paper is more related to
issues of omputer siene, one may also ask for the appliation of the results in an eonomi
ontext, in partiular to nanial markets. Surely, our paper an be seen as a omputational
experiment on the performane of dierent trading strategies in fae of noisy market returns.
In this ontext, the agent in our model may have two possible preferenes: liquidity preferene
[38℄ and speulative preferene. I.e. based on the previous returns the agent has a preferene to
keep ash or to invest in the market, respetively - whih is modeled by the risk-seeking and
risk-avoiding behavior.
Apart from this, our model allows only a limited interpretation in the ontext of nanial markets,
beause a number of important features in these markets are not overed or are even expliitely
exluded, for the sake of a ontrolled simulation setup:
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Heterogeneity : Agents in our model are homogenous with respet to the strategy employed, i.e.
there is no variability in their individual strategies.[17℄ In this respet, the model is basially
a representative agent model, whih takes into aount only the limited information of the
previous r(t). More elaborated strategies, where agents are assumed to be fundamentalist
or hartists [5, 8, 10℄ are also not onsidered here.
Interation: Agents in our model do not interat with other agents. They rather learn the
dynamis of the market return, in order to predit it more aurately. Important olle-
tive interations in nanial markets, suh as herding behavior, is negleted here, as well
as interations between (heterogeneous) trading strategies [10℄. This implies the absene
of emergent properties in our model, as heterogeneity and interation are indeed basi
premises for the existene of emergent properties in nanial markets.
Feedbak : Agents in our model have no eet upon the market, and onsequently the prie of
an asset and the return on investment are treated as exogenous variables. This is equivalent
to the 'atomisti market' assumption. Our model also neglets the olletive impat of all
agents on the prie and the return of an asset. Other feedbaks on the market, suh as
agent's expetations about the market dynamis itself, are also not expliitely modeled
here. Some artiial market models onsider an endogeneous approah, where the returns
are generated by means of onstant trading between heterogeneous agents [5, 8℄.
Mirofoundation: Our model is laking an adequate eonomi mirofoundation of the (repre-
sentative) agent behaviour. The terms risk-avoiding and risk-seeking are used to denote
the investment preferene of the agent. However, sine deisions are always taken based on
just the expeted return, the behaviour of the agent has to be lassied as risk neutral 
risk-adverse agents indeed aount also for the variane of returns in their deisions. Re-
ent literature in eonomis and nane presents a more realisti approah about behaviour
toward risk. [13, 30℄
Multi-assets: Agents in our model an only invest in one (risky) asset, whereas in nanial
markets multi-asset investments and portfolio strategies play the most ruial role. [7, 21℄
Multi-asset optimal investment strategies for risky assets were already disussed 50 years
ago, with an interesting relation to gambling [2℄. More reently, investment strategies to
readjust portfolios [23℄ have been extended [22℄ for a general distribution of return per
apital. Similar to our model, these ontributions onsider exogeneous returns whih are
drawn from a probability distribution or are modeled by a stohasti proesses.
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